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TAXATION - GIFT TAX - EACH BENEFICIARY OF TRUST AS DoNEE
FOR PURPOSE OF EXEMPTION PROVISION -In 1935, the donor created a trust
£or the benefit of seven children. The donor in her gift tax return, pursuant to
section 504b of the Gift Tax Act,1 excluded from the taxable amount $5,000
for each child. The commissioner's action in treating the trustee as the donee
and in allowing a single deduction of $5,000 was sustained by the Board of Tax
Appeals. The circuit court of appeals reversed.2 Held, that the taxpayer was
entitled to seven deductions, one for each beneficiary under the trust. Helvering
'U. Hutchings, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 653.
The Supreme Court, in holding that for the purpose of ascertaining the gift
tax deductions each beneficiary, rather than the trust itself, is the person to
whom the gift is made, sustained the practically unanimous view of the lower
federal courts.3 The opposite view, until recently tenaciously adhered to by the
Board of Tax Appeals,4 was based on the statutory definition of "person," which

1 Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 169 at 247, § 504(b) (1932), 26 U. S. C.
(1934), § 553 (b): "In the case of gifts (other than of future interests in property)
made to any person by the donor during the calendar year, the first $5,000 of such
gifts to such person shall not, for the purposes of subsection (a), be included in the
total amount of gifts made during such year."
2 Hutchings v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) III F. (2d) 229.
3 Pelzer v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 770; Welch v. Davidson,
(C. C. A. 1st, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 100, affirming Davidson v. Welch, (D. C. Mass.
1938) 22 F. Supp. 726; Rheinstrom v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 105 F.
(2d) 642; Robertson v. Nee, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 651; McBrier v.
Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 108 F. (2d) 967. Contra, United States v. Ryerson, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) II4 F. {2d) 150.
4 Hutchings v. Commissioner, 40 B. T. A. 27 (1939); Knox v. Commissioner,
36 B. T. A. 630 (1937); Rheinstrom v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 308 (1938);
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ehcompassed a "trust or estate," and upon remarks of the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Commissioner v. Wells,5 a case involving
the question whether the transfer was a gift of a "future interest in property."
As pointed out by Justice Stone, since the statutory definition of "person" applies
broadly to the entire revenue act, whether it means "trust" or "individual" will
depend on the context and purpose of the particular provision of the statute.6
The crux of the matter is Congressional intent. If the gift tax emphasis is on the
transfer of economic benefits rather than passage of legal title, then the result of
the principal case is easily justifiable.1 Aside from questions of statutory construction and Congressional intent, the chief argument for th!! view sustained
by the Supreme Court has been prevention of tax avoidance. A contrary result
would enable a donor to create many trusts for the same beneficiary, and thereby
become entitled to an exemption for each trust.8 Though meritorious at one
time, this argument has little foundation at present, since Congress in 1938,
impelled by the possibility of such contrivances,9 amended the exemption clause
to exclude all gifts in trust, as well as gifts of future interests previously excluded.10 The decision in the principal case will affect only those trusts created
prior to the effective date of that amendment. Even then, many gifts in trust
will fall within the provision denying benefit of exemptions to gifts of "future
interests" in property.11 In two cases companion to the principal case, the Court
indicated that it will take a very broad view as to what constitutes a gift of a
"future interest." Thus gifts of accumulated income or gifts contingent on
survivorship of the grantor are gifts of future interests.12 The Court in the principal case refused to express any opinion as to situations where the beneficiaries
are presently unknown or unascertainable or where impersonal or charitable purCox v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 865 (1938). However, in recent decisions the Board
of Tax Appeals yielded to the decisions of the circuit courts of appeal and allowed
deductions for each beneficiary, Rubinstein v. Commissioner, 41 B. T. A., No. 34
(1940).
5
Commissioner v. Wells, (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 339.
6
See the dissenting opinion by Disney in Cox v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A.
865 at 868 (1938).
1
Although the legal title passes to the trustee, still there is no taxable gift where
the settlor reserves some benefit or the power of disposition. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39, 60 S. Ct. 51 (1939). In Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S.
280 at 286, 287, 53 S. Ct. 369 (1933), the Court said: "The statute is not aimed at
every transfer of the legal title without consideration, ••• It is aimed at transfers of
the title that have the quality of a gift••••" And again: "Congress was aware that what
was of the essence of a transfer had come to be identified more nearly with a change
of economic benefits than with technicalities of title."
8
HARRiss, GIFT TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 71 (1940). Cox v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 865 at 869 (1938) (dissenting opinion by Disney). S. REP, 1567,
75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938), p. 41.
9
·
S. REP. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d sess. (1938), p. 41.
10 Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat. L. 447 at 565, § 505 (1938), 26 U. S. C.
(Supp. 1939), § 1003(b)(2).
11
See supra, note 1.
12
Ryerson v. United States, (U.S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 656; United States v. Pelzer,
(U. S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 659.
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poses are to be benefited. It has been suggested that in such circumstances the
transfer should be deemed a single gift to the trust, because the donor is motivated by a "general idea or ideal" rather than by "personal affection" for
designated individuals.18 However, where the ascertainment of the beneficiaries
is dependent on the happening of an uncertain future event, no difficulty arises,
for in such case there is a gift of a "future interest." 14
Alf d I • R othman
.n. re

18 See the concurring opinion by Judge Sibley in Hutchings v. Commissioner,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1940) III F. (2d) 229 at 231 (the principal case in the circuit court
of appeals).
H Ryerson v. United States, (U. S. 1941) 61 S. Ct. 656. "The exclusion is
denied to gifts of future interests because of the difficulty of determining the identity
and the number of the beneficiaries when the gift is to take effect only in the future."
HARRISS, GIFT TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 70 (1940).

